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Abstract  
Resource-dependent households often diversify their income. We model demand for remittances and 
supply of off-resource labor as a joint decision, and discuss household tradeoffs. We extend the off-farm 
labor supply literature to a rural fishery, contrasting our results to common findings in the farm literature 
and providing empirical evidence of the interdependence between education and family structure in 
determining income diversification. Using a unique dataset from Malaysia, we find that more educated 
households are less likely to diversify their income, with caveats depending on family composition. 
Policy implications for resource management in a remittance economy with alternative livelihoods are 
discussed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Resource-dependent households often diversify their income sources in response to resource 
scarcity and changing economic conditions. They may allocate labor to wage employment in 
local industries or receive financial support from working-age children, such as remittances from 
those living away from home or contributions from adult children living at home. A large 
literature dating back to Huffman (1980) has studied the determinants of off-farm labor supply 
among farming households, particularly with respect to the importance of human capital and 
family composition. This literature often treats financial support from family members as an 
exogenous source of income rather than as part of the household’s decision process; yet there is a 
tradeoff in allocating time between leisure and labor versus seeking financial support in order to 
finance consumption. However, since intra-household labor allocation between resource-
dependent sectors and remittance-earning outside sectors is a joint decision made by the 
household and not by individual members (Abdulai and Delgado 1999), labor supply decisions 
of the migrant or non-migrant extended family members who provide financial supports are 
incorporated in the household’s integrated labor allocation decisions; whereas the consequent 
intra-family flow of remittances are included in household’s utility maximization problem.  
While such migration takes place for various reasons, new economics of labor migration 
(NELM) argues that relative deprivation within a community can force households or individuals 
to migrate (Stark and Bloom 1985); whereas such deprivations can be triggered among the rural 
people, who have predominant dependence on natural-resource based livelihood mechanisms 
such as agriculture, fishing and forest-based activities. There may be opportunity costs to the 
household of the family member’s time, pecuniary and non-pecuniary transactions costs 
associated with sending and receiving funds, and disutility associated with requesting funds 
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and/or sending a family member away to work. Starting from Lucas and Stark (1985), a related 
strand of literature has studied the determinants of remittance supply from migrated family 
members and the consequent macroeconomic impacts (e.g., Rapoport and Docquier 2006; Yang 
2011; Brown and Jimenez-Soto 2014; Funkhouser 1995; McCormick and Wahba 2000). 
Especially the households living in marginal or frontier environment use natural resource 
extraction as insurance to smooth total income against income and livelihood risks (Takasaki, 
Barham, and Coomes 2010; Takasaki, Barham, and Coomes 2004; De Sherbinin et al. 2008; 
Takasaki 2011).1 We argue that because both remittances and off-resource labor supply can be 
used to supplement resource-dependent incomes, they may share common determinants at the 
household level of the recipient. That is, the determinants of labor/leisure allocation decisions 
may also determine the demand for intra-family financial support. However, this has not been 
thoroughly investigated in the context of resource dependence and resource management, 
especially in the case of fisheries.2  
In this article we investigate, in the tradition of Huffman (1980), the role of human capital 
and family structure in the joint determination of demands for financial support and non-fishery 
labor incomes for rural fishery-dependent households in Malaysia. In doing so, we review and 
combine three related strands of literature on off-resource labor supply, intra-family financial 
support, and natural resource management. First, the off-farm labor supply literature commonly 
treats intra-household financial support as an exogenous control variable, and generally finds that 
human capital has important influences on off-farm employment. Rural households with higher 
human capital tend to look for off-farm wage employment or otherwise switch from farm to off-
farm activities (e.g., Huffman 1980; Huffman and Lange 1989; Fafchamps and Quisumbing 
1999; Holden, Shiferaw, and Pender 2004; Yang 1997a; Taylor and Yunez-Naude 2000). 
5 
 
Further, the lack of appropriate human capital can act as a barrier to non-farm employment 
(Abdulai and CroleRees 2001; Escobal 2001; Barrett, Reardon, and Webb 2001; Barrett et al. 
2005). Education seems to have a greater impact on off-farm work opportunities than on the 
marginal product of farm labor, although an educated worker may generate knowledge spillovers 
onto farm productivity even while participating in off-farm work (Yang 1997a; Yang 1997b; 
Asadullah and Rahman 2009). In contrast, we find that educated households are generally less 
likely to earn non-fishery labor income or receive remittances, with some exceptions related to 
family structure. The fisheries literature in general has conflicting findings about the relationship 
between education and fishing productivity.3 In our empirical setting we find no evidence of 
education being associated with a shift in the marginal product of fishing labor, and we discuss 
alternative channels through which education may be related to off-fishery labor supply and 
remittance demand. 
Second, human capital and family structure are among the microeconomic determinants of 
the urban-to-rural and international flow of remittances (e.g., Lucas and Stark 1985; Rapoport 
and Docquier 2006; Yang 2011; Brown and Jimenez-Soto 2014; Funkhouser 1995).4 Much of 
this literature focuses on the migrant’s decision to remit, or on macroeconomic issues such as 
brain-drain, migrant labor allocation and real exchange rates (Rapoport and Docquier 2006),5 and 
not on natural resources management as we know of. Papers investigating the interplay between 
remittance receipts and alternative local labor employment do not generally consider them as 
simultaneously determined sources of supplementary income. For example, Yang (2008) 
considers remittances as insurance against income vulnerability in a decaying resource stock 
industry, and his results imply a positive relationship between remittances and non-resource-
based incomes. In contrast, we observe very few fishing households in our setting with both 
6 
 
remittance income and non-fishing labor income. Another strand of this literature investigates 
the causal effect of remittance receipts on labor supply and finds that the effect can be positive or 
negative depending on family structure and human capital (e.g., Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
2006; Grigorian and Melkonyan 2011); the net effect on household labor supply may depend on 
whether the lost income from out-migrating children is replaced by new remittance income – and 
this in turn can depend on human capital levels. Our study complements and extends this 
literature by jointly estimating the human capital and family structure determinants of off-
resource labor earnings and receipts of financial support, rather than the causal effect of 
remittances on labor, treating the demands for financial support and non-fishery incomes as a 
joint decision.  
Third, the literature on resource management with respect to off-resource labor supply 
primarily explores the relationship between resource dependence and labor allocation again 
assuming intra-family financial support is exogenous to resource exploitation and labor supply 
(e.g., Barbier 2007; Barbier 2010). For example, Barbier (2007) considers exogenous remittances 
when studying the labor allocation decisions of mangrove-dependent rural households, whereas 
Barbier (2010) focuses on the impact of resource abundance on labor allocation to explore 
implications for poverty traps and resource degradation. We provide a detailed discussion of the 
implications of our theoretical model and empirical results for resource management. 
This is the first such investigation for fishing households that we know of. Many rural fishing 
households lack formal or well-functioning credit and insurance markets (e.g., Abdulai and 
CroleRees 2001; Barbier 2010), so supplementary income sources are important for the 
household’s well-being. Although global fish production has exceeded population growth over 
the past several decades, the vast majority of this growth has come from aquaculture while 
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production from marine capture fisheries has declined due to resource stock degradation, and 
employment in capture fisheries has declined even more dramatically (FAO 2014). This poses a 
global conservation and development problem when it comes to supporting livelihoods and 
conserving or rebuilding stocks. Traditionally, fishing was thought of as an occupation of last 
resort in which fishers are among the poorest people who may switch their occupation with 
minimal incentives, but a more recent literature has shown that some fishers enjoy their 
occupation and are reluctant to permanently change livelihoods even with potentially drastic 
resource stock declines (e.g., Pollnac, Pomeroy, and Harkes 2001; Cinner, Daw, and 
McClanahan 2009; Muallil 2009; Daw et al. 2012; Slater, Napigkit, and Stead 2013; Reddy, 
Groves, and Nagavarapu 2014).  
For empirical investigation, we use a uniquely detailed survey dataset of individual fishing 
captains from the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia which separately measures the households’ 
receipts of financial support from working-age children who live in the home versus outside the 
home – an important detail not present in many rural household surveys that gather information 
about remittances – in addition to fishing revenue and non-fishery labor income. Using a series 
of lognormal hurdle (LH) models for non-fishery labor income and financial support,6 we find 
that human capital (i.e., schooling status of the household head) and family size influence the 
demands for financial support (i.e., receipts of contributions from live-in children and 
remittances from live-away children) and non-fishery incomes. More educated households are 
less likely to earn non-fishing labor income or receive intra-family financial support, unless they 
have large families. In general, larger families are more likely to receive intra-family transfers 
and less likely to have non-fishery labor incomes. We discuss the implications for fisheries 
management of policies that reduce remittance transactions costs or develop non-fishing 
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employment sectors as alternatives to standard policies that attempt to limit or otherwise regulate 
fishing inputs.  
 
II. AN ANALYTICAL MODEL OF RURAL FISHING HOUSEHOLDS 
Consider a representative fishery-dependent household that maximizes utility subject to time, 
income, and fishing harvest constraints. The household’s primary income source is the market 
sale of harvested fish, but members may also participate in non-fishing wage employment and 
may seek financial support from working-age children. For simplicity, we assume that working-
age family members’ labor is homogeneous and the household makes joint allocation decisions 
over the total labor endowment 𝐿, which potentially includes allocating members’ time to distant 
labor markets for the purpose of sending remittances back home.7 The household head runs the 
fishing operation, including operating the fishing boat as its captain and managing production, 
sales, etc, and therefore the labor allocated to fishing is always positive. In our empirical setting, 
the household head is also the fishing captain and the head of the fishing business, so we will use 
these terms interchangeably.  
Household utility is assumed to be determined by a market-purchased composite 
consumption good 𝑥, the amount of labor allocated to remittance-earning activities 𝑙𝑅, and 
leisure 𝑙𝑢, broadly defined to include production and consumption of nonmarket goods within 
the household (Barnum and Squire 1979). Note that the representative household makes a joint 
decision for all its working-age members about the allocation of labor between fishing and non-
fishing activities in the same locality as well as remittance-earning activities outside the locality. 
The demand for financial support is met through household’s choice of 𝑙𝑅 at an increasing and 
convex cost to household utility. The disutility of remittances can arise from worry over the 
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migrant family member’s well-being, or from shame or reduction in status from requesting 
financial support.8 If the household actively selects a family member to out-migrate for the 
purpose of remitting, they may experience both sources of disutility as well as an opportunity 
cost of foregone labor in the fishing operation and in home production. It is also possible that 
family members migrate for personal reasons rather than as part of a joint household decision, 
but the household may subsequently request financial support. In this case, the household may 
still experience the second source of disutility, and we can think of 𝑙𝑅 as a monetary request that 
does not enter the household’s labor endowment. Our empirical evidence is consistent with both 
a direct disutility of remittance requests and an indirect opportunity cost to the household, so we 
allow for both channels in the model.9, 10 The household maximizes 
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙𝑢, 𝑙𝑅; 𝜓, ℎ) = 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑙𝑢; 𝜓, ℎ) − 𝑣(𝑙𝑅; 𝜓, ℎ),                                                                                    [1]  
where ℎ is the level of human capital attained by the household head, and 𝜓 is a vector of 
household characteristics, such as the age of the household head and family size.11 We assume 
that 𝑢 is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in its arguments: 𝑢𝑥, 𝑢𝑙𝑢 >
0, 𝑢𝑥𝑥, 𝑢𝑙𝑢𝑙𝑢 < 0; whereas 𝑣 is strictly convex and twice continuously differentiable, 𝑣𝑅 >
0, 𝑣𝑅𝑅 > 0, so that the overall utility function 𝑈 is well-behaved.  
The marginal utility of consumption and leisure, and the marginal disutility of requesting 
financial support, in general depend on both family composition and human capital attained. For 
example, the marginal utility of consumption and leisure (or home production) may depend on 
the number of school-aged children supported within the home, and the satisfaction of supporting 
their education may depend on the education level of the household head. To the extent that there 
are educational spillovers from parent to child, however, educated households may produce 
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children with greater income-earning potential, which could reduce the marginal disutility of 
requesting financial support. We will return to this discussion in the analysis of the model. 
The household harvests fish according to the concave and twice continuously differentiable 
production technology:  
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑙; 𝑁, 𝑐, 𝜓, ℎ),     𝑓𝑙 > 0, 𝑓𝑙𝑙 < 0,                                                                                                       [2]  
where 𝑙 denotes household labor employed in fishing activities, 𝑁 represents characteristics of 
the fishery such as resource stocks and regulatory structures that are exogenous to and common 
across individual fishing households, and 𝑐 is a composite predetermined fixed input such as the 
type of boat available to the household.12 We allow for the possibility that family size affects 
fishing productivity, such as the number of working-age children available to assist with fishing 
operations. Because the household head is also the fishing captain and business manager, age and 
human capital attainment can also affect fishing productivity.  
The household allocates its labor endowment between fishing, local wage employment, 
leisure or home production, and distant labor markets according to:  
𝐿 = 𝑙 + 𝑙𝑤 + 𝑙𝑢 + 𝑙𝑅 ,     𝑙 > 0, 𝑙𝑢 > 0, 𝑙𝑤 ≥ 0, 𝑙𝑅 ≥ 0.                                                                         [3]  
We assume positive fishing labor, 𝑙 > 0, because fishing is the primary occupation of the 
household. The household may also supply 𝑙𝑤 ≥ 0 for paid employment at the local market 
wage rate 𝑤 to earn non-fishing income 𝑤𝑙𝑤. While we treat wages as exogenous, wage rates 
may differ with more educated household heads able to attain higher-paying non-fishing 
employment so that 𝑤 = 𝑤(ℎ), 𝑤ℎ > 0.
13 Since ℎ is predetermined in a static framework, and is 
not a choice variable, and we continue using the notation 𝑤 instead of 𝑤(ℎ).  
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We normalize the price of 𝑥 to unity and let 𝑝 denote the market price of fish. The household 
earns 𝑝𝑦 + 𝑤𝑙𝑤 from fishing and non-fishing employment, spends 𝑥 on consumption, and may 
receive financial support 𝛼𝑙𝑅. Here 𝛼 is the fraction of the family member’s income received by 
the household, summarizing wages in the distant labor market and transactions costs of financial 
transfers. Plugging [2] in for fish harvest, equation [4] expresses the income constraint as: 
𝑥 = 𝑝𝑓(𝑙; 𝑁, 𝑐, 𝜓, ℎ) + 𝑤𝑙𝑤 + 𝛼𝑙𝑅 ,       𝑥 > 0, 𝑓(𝑙; 𝑁, 𝑐, 𝜓, ℎ) > 0, 𝑙𝑅 ≥ 0.                                     [4]  
The household maximizes equation [1] subject to [3], [4] and the inequality constraints 𝑙𝑤 ≥
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑅 ≥ 0: 
max
𝑥,𝑙𝑢,𝑙𝑅,𝑙𝑤,𝑙
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑙𝑢; 𝜓, ℎ) − 𝑣(𝑙𝑅; 𝜓, ℎ) − 𝜆[𝑥 − 𝑝𝑓(𝑙; 𝑁, 𝑐, 𝜓, ℎ) − 𝑤𝑙𝑤 − 𝛼𝑙𝑅]
− 𝜇(𝑙 + 𝑙𝑤 + 𝑙𝑢 + 𝑙𝑅 − 𝐿) − 𝛾𝑤𝑙
𝑤 − 𝛾𝑅𝑙
𝑅 ,    𝛾𝑤𝑙
𝑤 = 0, 𝛾𝑅𝑙
𝑅 = 0, 
where 𝛾𝑤, 𝛾𝑅 are the shadow values of the inequality constraints and 𝜆, 𝜇 are the shadow values 
of the income and time constraints, respectively. The first-order conditions for an interior 
optimum (𝛾𝑤 = 𝛾𝑅 = 0) are given by [3], [4], and: 
              
𝑢𝑥 = 𝜆
𝑢𝑙𝑢 = 𝜇
𝑣𝑅 = 𝛼𝜆 − 𝜇
𝑤𝜆 = 𝜇
𝜆𝑝𝑓𝑙 = 𝜇.
 
Together these imply that 𝑤 =
𝑢𝑙𝑢
𝑢𝑥
= 𝑝𝑓𝑙 = 𝛼 −
𝑣𝑅
𝑢𝑥
, or that when nonzero amounts of 
household labor are optimally allocated to all activities, this allocation equates the marginal 
value of time across activities: the local non-fishing labor wage, the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and consumption, the marginal value product of fishing labor, and the remittance 
rate less the relative disutility of requesting financial support from family members. One 
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implication of this is that the distant labor market must pay a premium in order to induce 
migration, which covers the marginal rate of substitution between household consumption and 
the disutility of requesting support. This can be seen by solving the marginal condition for 𝛼 =
𝑣𝑅+𝑢𝑙𝑢
𝑢𝑥
=
𝑣𝑅
𝑢𝑥
+ 𝑝𝑓𝑙 =
𝑣𝑅
𝑢𝑥
+ 𝑤. 
The conditions for a more general solution in which 𝑙𝑤 and/or 𝑙𝑅 may be at a corner solution 
are summarized by:  
𝑤 ≤ 𝑢𝑙𝑢 𝑢𝑥⁄ = 𝑝𝑓𝑙        𝑎𝑛𝑑       𝛼 ≤
𝑣𝑅+𝑢𝑙𝑢
𝑢𝑥
.                                                                                             [5]   
That is, the marginal value product of fishing labor and the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure or home production are always equated at the optimum, which 
is consistent with the NELM literature. For example, Stark (1991) hypothesized that migrant’s 
remittances enable rural households to overcome credit and risk constraints related to their 
production decisions. Consistent with this, we assume that migration of members is a joint 
decision made by the household. However, we do not explicitly model the migration decision 
since our dataset does not contain detailed information on migrant household members. 
Although migrants might be a non-random sub-sample of the rural population (Hoddinott 1994), 
the process that determines out-migration may be unrelated to labor supply decisions (Dustmann 
and Görlach 2016b). Especially since many migrations are temporary (Dustmann and Görlach 
2016a), and since we only focus on labor allocation decisions, we do not model migration 
explicitly, rather we use proxies such as education and levels of income from fishing which 
characterize the household decision to send a migrant (Haberfeld et al. 1999).  
However, our model indirectly captures the increased income of the migrant household 
members relative to the origin. Consistent with Rozelle, Taylor, and deBrauw (1999), 
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remittances received from migrant family members may have positive or negative effects on 
local non-fishing income: positive effects if they are complements, and negative effects if they 
are substitutes. Furthermore, the stylized fact we observe in our data is that almost all households 
are at a corner solution for either 𝑙𝑤 or 𝑙𝑅. Therefore, corner solutions, 𝑙𝑤∗ ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑅
∗
≥ 0, to 
our optimization problem are important. If the marginal value of time in fishing and leisure 
exceeds the marginal value of time in the local labor market, no labor will be supplied for local 
wage employment. Likewise, if the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
combined remittance opportunity costs exceeds the remittance rate 𝛼, no financial support will 
be requested. The combined remittance opportunity cost includes the direct disutility of 
requesting financial support and/or sending away a migrant, and the household opportunity cost 
of the migrant’s labor.  
If there is no disutility from remittances, then we have: 
𝑤 ≤ 𝑢𝑙𝑢 𝑢𝑥⁄ = 𝑝𝑓𝑙        𝑎𝑛𝑑       𝛼 ≤ 𝑢𝑙𝑢 𝑢𝑥⁄ = 𝑝𝑓𝑙  ,                                                                              [5
′]  
in which case local non-fishing labor income and remittances are perfect substitutes and 
households choose the most remunerative non-fishing income opportunity, or none at all. 
If, on the other hand, a family member makes a private decision to migrate which is 
independent of the household’s joint decision and labor endowment, and the household 
experiences disutility from requesting financial support from that person, then we have: 
𝑤 ≤ 𝑢𝑙𝑢 𝑢𝑥⁄ = 𝑝𝑓𝑙    𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑢𝑥 ≤ 𝑣𝑅    ⟹    𝑢𝑙𝑢 𝑣𝑅⁄ ≤ 𝑢𝑙𝑢 𝑢𝑥⁄ = 𝑝𝑓𝑙 ,                                             [5
′′]   
determining the optimal labor allocation and financial support demand, and households may 
choose either, both, or neither sources of supplementary income. This scenario is depicted in 
Figure 1. 
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We will focus on the model with [5] because it captures the special cases of [5'] and [5"]. Let 
?̅? ≡ [𝑢𝑙𝑢 𝑢𝑥⁄ = 𝑝𝑓𝑙] define the reservation wage at which the household does not supply labor 
for outside employment, and ?̅? ≡
𝑣𝑅+𝑢𝑙𝑢
𝑢𝑥
|
𝑙𝑅=0
 define the reservation remittance rate at which the 
household does not supply labor to distant markets. The household’s non-fishing labor supply 
and financial support demand functions are therefore given by:  
𝑙𝑤∗(𝜦) = {
𝑙𝑤∗∗(𝜦) 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 ≥ ?̅?
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 < ?̅?
   𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑙𝑅
∗
(𝜦) = {
𝑙𝑅
∗∗
(𝜦) 𝑖𝑓 𝛼 ≥ ?̅?
0 𝑖𝑓 𝛼 < ?̅?
 ,                                         [6]  
where 𝚲 = {𝜓, ℎ, 𝑁, 𝑐, 𝑝, 𝑤}. Both the functions, 𝑙𝑤∗(𝚲) and 𝑙𝑅
∗
(𝚲), are censored at zero what 
would be the optimal choices 𝑙𝑤∗∗(𝚲) and 𝑙𝑅
∗∗
(𝚲) absent non-negativity constraints. Optimal 
decisions fall into one of four cases: a corner solution for local labor supply and financial support 
demand, an interior solution for both, and a corner solution for one of the supplemental income 
sources with an interior solution for the other. Although each of these cases is technically 
possible, an interior solution for both may be less likely because of the opportunity cost of the 
household labor; increasing one supplemental income source generally implies a reduction in the 
other. These tradeoffs are illustrated in Figure 2.  
The comparative statics of 𝑙𝑤∗ and 𝑙𝑅
∗
 cannot be signed in general because of the potential 
for human capital attainment and family characteristics to interact as they affect multiple sources 
of income and utility. To see this, consider Figure 2. At the initial remittance rate 𝛼 and wage 𝑤, 
there is an interior solution for both sources of supplementary income. An increase in education 
could raise 𝛼 to 𝛼′ as shown in Panel A by improving the income-earning opportunities in a 
distant urban labor market. Some family members are then more likely to migrate, increasing the 
marginal utility of leisure and home production and reducing the time allocated to local labor 
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markets and/or fishing. Note that we would also observe an increase in 𝛼 when distant labor 
markets are booming, or if there are fewer transactions costs, such as lower banking and transfer 
fees or more money transfer institutions in proximity to the rural household. Education could 
also make the household eligible for better local employment, raising the wage from 𝑤 to 𝑤′ as 
in Panel B and increasing the household’s supply of local wage labor, but also raising the 
marginal utility of leisure and shifting in the supply of labor to the distant market. Local 
alternative livelihoods programs could have a similar impact on 𝑤, drawing labor out of the 
fishery but also potentially out of leisure as well as reducing out-migration. These competing 
effects are further complicated by the potential for human capital to change the marginal 
productivity of home production, which here is captured by the marginal utility of leisure. This 
would shift up the labor supply curve for both local and distant markets, reducing the likelihood 
of any income diversification. Likewise, education could improve the productivity of fishing, 
shifting out the fishing labor demand curve (𝑝𝑓𝑙). This directly reduces the local wage labor 
supply, and eventually increases the marginal utility of leisure, which also reduces remittances. 
The net effect of an increase in human capital on labor allocation therefore depends on the 
relative impacts on marginal utilities, marginal fishing productivity, and outside opportunities.  
The effect of family characteristics is similarly ambiguous. Consider, for example, the effect 
of an increase in the number of working-age children living outside the home. How this impacts 
the marginal disutility of requesting financial support (𝑣𝑅) depends on the employment success 
of these children. Raising more children may leave fewer resources available for the education of 
each child, making the children less able to provide financial support in adulthood. This could 
increase the household’s marginal disutility of requesting financial support and shift in the 
supply of labor to remittance-earning activities. If the household head is well-educated, and 
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education spills over to the children, then the opposite may be true – having more adult children 
may decrease 𝑣𝑅, increasing the likelihood of positive financial support. However, while an 
increase in education may have an indirect positive effect on 𝑣𝑅 as described, it may also have a 
direct negative effect if requesting financial support is more shameful for a more educated 
household head.  
As the goal of this paper is to provide econometric evidence for which of these competing 
effects is empirically important in determining the composition of income sources, we turn now 
to the details of the empirical approach.14  
 
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND DATA 
Empirical strategy 
The conceptual model shows that the optimal decisions of supplementary income sources can 
be described by two simultaneous binary choices of whether or not to supply local wage labor 
and whether or not to request financial support, as well as an outside labor supply function and a 
financial support demand function that are both left-censored at zero. Let 𝑑𝑛𝑓 be an indicator for 
the household’s decision to supply outside labor or not, and let 𝑑𝑓𝑠 be an indicator for the 
decision to request financial support or not. The household’s decision is described by one of four 
possible cases: 
Case 1: A corner solution for local wage labor supply and financial support demand: 𝑑𝑛𝑓 =
0, 𝑑𝑓𝑠 = 0   if   𝑤 < ?̅?  and α < ?̅?, 𝑙𝑤∗(𝚲) = 0, 𝑙𝑅
∗
(𝚲) = 0. 
Case 2: An interior solution for local labor supply and a corner solution for financial support: 
𝑑𝑛𝑓 = 1, 𝑑𝑓𝑠 = 0   if   𝑤 = ?̅? and  α < ?̅?, 𝑙𝑤∗(𝜦) > 0, 𝑙𝑅
∗
(𝜦) = 0. 
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Case 3: A corner solution for local labor supply and an interior solution for financial support: 
𝑑𝑛𝑓 = 0, 𝑑𝑓𝑠 = 1   if   𝑤 < ?̅?  and α = ?̅?, 𝑙𝑤∗(𝜦) = 0, 𝑙𝑅
∗
(𝜦) > 0. 
Case 4: An interior solution for local labor supply and financial support demand: 𝑑𝑛𝑓 =
1, 𝑑𝑓𝑠 = 1   if   𝑤 = ?̅?  and α = ?̅?, 𝑙𝑤∗(𝚲) > 0, 𝑙𝑅
∗
(𝚲) > 0. 
The conceptual model and subsequent discussion indicate that the choice between outside 
employment and financial support depends on the strength of interactions between human capital 
and family composition. Based on this theoretical discussion, our objective is to provide 
econometric evidence of the empirical determinants of income composition.  
Equation [6] indicates that the optimal choice of non-fishing labor earnings and financial 
support follows a system of equations in which corner solutions are possible. In our sample, 
almost all fishermen are at a corner solution for one or both sources of non-fishing income. We 
therefore employ a two-part lognormal hurdle model that is appropriate for the presence of 
corner solutions (Wooldridge 2010).15 This model simultaneously estimates the probabilities of 
earning positive non-fishing labor income and/or financial support (the participation decision in 
equation [7]), along with the quantities of both income sources (the amount decision in equation 
[7]),16 as functions of a vector of schooling and family composition variables 𝑥𝑖, and a vector of 
control variables 𝑧𝑖. Following Wooldridge (2010), we can formally express the empirical model 
of non-fishing labor income and financial support for household 𝑖 as 
𝑛𝑓𝑖 = 𝟏(𝑥𝑖
′𝛼1 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽1 + 𝜖1𝑖 > 0) ⋅ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖
′𝛾1 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛿1 + 𝑢1𝑖) 
𝑓𝑠𝑖 = 𝟏(𝑥𝑖
′𝛼2 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽2 + 𝜖2𝑖 > 0) ⋅ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖
′𝛾2 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛿2 + 𝑢2𝑖)
,                                                             [7]  
where 𝟏(. ) is an indicator variable determined by a probit model. We assume (𝜖, 𝑢) are 
independent of (𝑥, 𝑧), and that 𝜖 and 𝑢 are independent of each other in each equation.17 We 
make two further assumptions to reflect the fact that we observe very few fishermen at an 
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interior solution for both sources of non-fishing income. First, we assume that (𝑢1, 𝑢2) are 
independent of each other, which captures the absence of marginal tradeoffs in the “amount” 
decisions if one “amount” is always zero when the other is positive. Second, we allow (𝜖1, 𝜖2) to 
follow a standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation parameter 𝜌, which captures the 
decreased likelihood of earning non-fishing labor income if financial support is not zero, and 
vice versa (and we therefore expect a negative estimate of 𝜌). This is formally equivalent to 
estimating a bivariate probit model on the participation dummy variables 𝑑𝑛𝑓𝑖 and 𝑑𝑓𝑠𝑖 and 
estimating separate linear models on the natural log of the non-zero income amounts 
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖 and 𝑙𝑓𝑠𝑖 by maximum likelihood.
18, 19 
The parameters of interest are coefficients on the schooling and family composition 
variables, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛾1, and 𝛾2. The vector 𝑥𝑖 includes schooling, family size, and their interaction. 
We define schooling as 1 if the household head has at least a secondary education and 0 if not.20 
The vector of control variables 𝑧𝑖 includes quadratic terms for the fishing captain’s age, boat 
ownership status, boat type, and professional membership in fishermen’s associations. We use 
the number of years living in the village as a proxy for age because the fishermen surveyed were 
not asked their age directly. Mobility among Malaysian fishing captains is very low, and the 
distribution of our age proxy is what would be expected from an age variable, with less than 10% 
of respondents reporting fewer than 15 years in the village, and 10% reporting more than 55 
years. We define boat ownership as 1 if the fisherman owns the boat he operates and 0 otherwise, 
boat type as 1 if the boat is in a larger commercial class suitable for offshore fishing and 0 if the 
boat is in the smaller category suitable for inshore fishing, and membership as 1 if the fisherman 
is a member of a fishermen’s association and 0 otherwise. These control variables generally 
capture the fishing captain’s attachment to the fishing profession.21 Finally, we include a vector 
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of district dummy variables, Δ𝑑, to control for regional variation in market access and resource 
stock quality or abundance. We could not control for gender or ethnicity because all the surveyed 
fishermen are males, and 353 out of 354 are of Malay descent.  
Data and Variables 
We use the Malaysian Turtle Survey 2005, hereafter MTS-2005, which was conducted from 
September 20, 2005 to March 24, 2006. The survey was designed, supervised and administered 
by the Malaysian Department of Fisheries, the Turtle and Marine Ecosystem Centre, World 
Wildlife Fund-Malaysia, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration-Fisheries, the 
Department of Economics at University of California San Diego, and The WorldFish Center 
(Yeo et al. 2007). Altogether, MTS-2005 surveyed a stratified random sample of 354 fishing 
captains from three states on the east coast of peninsular Malaysia. The survey sites begin near 
Kuantan in the state of Pahang up to the Besut district in the state of Terengganu and the Pasir 
Puteh district in the state of Kelantan. Respondents were asked questions about socioeconomic 
status, household characteristics, fishing operations and conservation attitudes, making it a 
uniquely detailed data source with which to empirically investigate the tradeoffs delineated in the 
previous section.22 We assume that a fisherman, who is the principal income earner and the head 
of household, represents his corresponding household as the survey respondent.  
Table 1 describes and summarizes the variables we use in the empirical analysis. Despite 
investing in new technologies and capital to maintain fishing productivity, many of the 
respondents state that they do not want their children involved in fishing, and that limitations in 
their own education or opportunity set prevent them from switching occupations permanently 
(Gilbert and Yeo 2014). Consistent with this notion, we find that the total household income 
comprises fishing and non-fishing incomes as well as financial support from live-in and live-
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away children. All the monetary units are expressed in Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), which was 
equivalent to USD 0.265 per unit on January 1, 2006. A typical fishing household earns MYR 
816 and MYR 248 from fishing and non-fishing employments, and receives MYR 34 in financial 
supports from children, making its average household income of MYR 1,147. The average 
household size is 7.64. We find that although 74% of the fishermen have their own fishing boats, 
only 41% of those boats are larger vessels suitable for deep-sea fishing. Therefore, we control for 
both ownership and size of fishing boats in all our regressions to capture the potential variations 
in remittance and non-fishing employment seeking behaviors resulting from them.  
The MTS-2005 dataset did not collect fishermen’s age and years of schooling. However, 
since the fishermen typically do not move between villages, we use the number of years living in 
their villages of current residence as a proxy for their corresponding ages. This is a valid 
assumption since we find that, on average, fishermen live in their villages for more than 36 
years. Next, in absence of any continuous measure of the years of schooling, we use secondary 
schooling, defined as 1 if the fisherman completed at least 10th grade and 0 if not, as a measure 
of human capital influencing their non-fishing income earning capability. We find that only 30% 
of the surveyed fishermen have secondary schooling, which is consistent with their remittance-
seeking behavior. Finally, we also control for fishermen’s professional affiliations that might 
influence their likeliness to get access to income earning opportunities beyond fishing especially 
during the lean seasons. Table 1 shows that 84% of fishermen have membership in some kind of 
fisherman’s association.  
The MTS-2005 dataset also provides information on total fishing revenue, itemized costs of 
production, peak and lean season catches and earnings, properties of fishing vessels, and share of 
catch. Table 1 shows that the total revenue from the latest fishing trip amounts to MYR 2,952, 
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which includes the shares for crews (27%), owners (54%), and the captain (14%), respectively. 
Besides, the total cost is MYR 254. In addition, there are considerable differences between peak 
and lean season earnings and catches: fishermen catch 2,508 kgs of fish during the peak seasons 
and earn MYR 4,898; whereas the corresponding figures stand only at 444 kgs and MYR 658 
during the lean seasons. Average duration of the latest fishing trip was 26 hours, whereas the 
average number of people involved was 6. Moreover, average size of the fishing boats used were 
11.42 feet in length and 3.34 feet in width; whereas those boats were equipped with 116hpb and 
10.26 ton engines.  
Next, Table 2 provides summary statistics for four categories of fishing households by their 
supplemental income decisions. The majority of the sample (60%) receives no outside income or 
financial support, while slightly more households earn local wage income than receive financial 
support (22% versus 16%). Only 2% of households receive both sources of supplemental 
income, which is consistent with our model’s prediction that each source incurs a household 
opportunity cost. The calculation of financial support includes contributions from both the 
working-age children living with and away from their parents. For comparison purposes we 
estimate our econometric specifications using this total financial support calculation (Table 3), as 
well as the breakdown of financial support (remittances from live-away children versus 
contributions from live-in children as reported in Table 4).  
The summary statics describing the profile of fishermen in different income-earning 
categories are consistent with previous literature (e.g., Abdulai and CroleRees 2001; Carter and 
Barrett 2006; Corral and Reardon 2001; Escobal 2001; Narain, Gupta, and van’t Veld 2008). In 
general, financial support recipients (i.e., NF=0, FS>0) are the poorest in terms of total 
household income and outside income earners (i.e., NF>0, FS=0) are the richest. In addition, 
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financial support recipients have lower schooling and greater family size than the outside income 
earners. 
 
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS  
Main Results 
Table 3 reports the key parameter estimates and marginal effects from bivariate probit 
regressions based on equation [7].23 A statistically significant value of 𝜌 verifies the presence of 
cross-equation correlation in the participation decisions, justifying the use of bivariate probit 
models. The statistically significant 𝜒2 value of 170.5 verifies that the regressors are jointly 
significant. Further, the predicted probabilities of each of the four cases evaluated at the mean 
value of the regressors are very close to the corresponding sample frequencies in Table 2, 
validating our fitted models (Cameron and Trivedi 2010): 60% that no income diversification 
occurs, 15.9% that financial support is received but non-fishing labor income is not earned, 
21.8% that non-fishing labor income is earned but no financial support is received, and 2.3% that 
both supplementary income sources are received. The following discussion of results focuses 
mainly on the relationship between schooling, family characteristics, and the choice between 
outside labor income and family financial support. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report participation decisions using family size as the single 
measure of family characteristics.24 The estimated coefficients indicate that fishermen with larger 
families are more likely to receive financial support, but their likelihood of earning non-fishing 
labor income depends on their secondary schooling status; larger families decrease the likelihood 
of non-fishing labor earnings if the household head is not educated, but the opposite is true for 
educated household heads. The marginal effects show that educated households are 28.4% more 
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likely to not diversify away from fishing income, but that likelihood decreases by 3.6% for each 
additional family member. An additional family member raises the probability of receiving 
financial support by 1.5%. Further, each additional family member decreases the likelihood of 
earning non-fishing labor income by 2.2% if the household head does not have secondary 
schooling – but this effect is more than offset by a 4.8% if the household head is educated. 
Results in Table 3 are consistent with the possibility that financial support relaxes the 
household budget constraint and reduces the need for wage labor earnings by household 
members, as has been found under some conditions in Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) and 
Grigorian and Melkonyan (2011). In this specification, financial support is calculated as the sum 
of contributions to household income from working age children living both inside and outside 
the home. In rural fishing households, working-age children living at home are often employed 
in the family fishing enterprise, so a greater family labor pool is likely to lead to more intensive 
fishing activities and fewer non-fishing work activities; those children are also likely to 
contribute some of their fishing income to the total household income, which would explain this 
result.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 report estimated relationships with the amount decisions – 
the natural log of non-fishing labor income and family financial support. For non-fishing labor 
income, the signs of the coefficients generally match those of the participation decision; educated 
household heads are not only less likely to earn non-fishing labor income unless they have large 
families, but conditional on participating they also earn less, again unless they have large 
families. For financial support, however, educated household heads receive significantly more 
than uneducated ones unless they have large families. This may reflect educated household heads 
investing more in the human capital of their children, who are then better able to exit the fishery 
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for better livelihoods. In fact, educated household heads are more likely to invest on the 
betterment of the future generations due to their higher allocative efficiency through higher 
degree of technology adoption (Abdulai and Huffman 2014; Abdulai and Huffman 2005; 
Huffman 1974; Wozniak 1984; Wozniak 1993). Large families, on the other hand, may have 
fewer resources to educate and/or fund the migration of their children, so their children may be 
more likely to work in the family fishing enterprise or in other local positions.25 
We can see this more clearly by dividing the financial support variable into contributions 
from live-in working-age children and true remittances from migrants. Table 4 reports results 
obtained by allowing the models from Table 3 to have three participation equations and three 
amount equations in order to account for these two types of family financial support. Rather than 
a biprobit for the participation equations, we now estimate a triprobit model for the three binary 
dependent variables: whether or not the household earns non-fishing labor income as before, 
whether or not the household receives live-in contributions (denoted 𝑑𝑓𝑠1), and whether or not 
the household receives live-away remittances (denoted 𝑑𝑓𝑠2). Each amount equation is linear, 
with the natural log of the non-zero amounts of each income source as the dependent variable, 
estimated by maximum likelihood. As before, Table 4 reports the results with family size as the 
only measure of family characteristics. Note that the amount equations have fewer observations 
than previously because few households receive both types of family financial support. We 
therefore dropped several control variables in order to reduce the number of parameters 
estimated.  
The results in Table 4 mostly corroborate those reported in Table 3, but help to clarify the 
channels. These results are again consistent with the interpretation that educated households 
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prefer to invest in the human capital of a few potential migrants rather than seek local non-
fishing labor earnings. Specifically, we see that:  
1) a larger family size increases the likelihood of receiving any financial support from 
live-in working-age children (column (2) of Table 4); 
2) however, a larger family size also decreases the amount of that type of support 
(column (5) of Table 4); 
3) educated households are less likely to earn non-fishing labor income – and they earn 
less of it – while they receive more in migrant remittances, unless they have large 
families (columns (1), (4), and (6) of Table 4). 
Education, Family Structure, and the Marginal Product of Fishing Labor 
In this section, we investigate one channel through which human capital and family structure 
can affect income diversification: fishing productivity. As our model shows, human capital and 
family structure can affect non-fishing income decisions through either the marginal value 
product of fishing labor, or through the utility function (i.e., through shifts in the curves in 
Figures 1 and 2). For example, our finding that educated households are less likely to earn non-
fishing labor income could result from an outward shift in the marginal value product of fishing 
labor, e.g., if educated captains are better fishermen. The same result could also be driven by an 
increase in the marginal utility of leisure, however, if education increases the value of home 
production. Similarly, differences in remittance receipts by education status could be driven by 
shifts in the marginal product of fishing labor or an increase in the marginal disutility of 
requesting financial support, e.g., if educated households feel more shame or guilt from relying 
on their adult children. In order to distinguish between these channels, we estimate the 
relationship between fishing productivity and education, fishing experience, and various 
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measures of family labor. We estimate a log-linearized Cobb-Douglas production function of the 
form: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝒘𝒊
′𝜽𝒘 + 𝒙𝒊
′𝜽𝒙 + 𝒛𝒊
′𝜽𝒛 + 𝜈𝑖 ,                                                                                                    [8]  
where 𝑦𝑖 is the fishing revenue from the most recent fishing trip, 𝒘𝒊 is a vector of the natural log 
of production inputs from the most recent fishing trip, 𝒙𝒊 is a vector of human capital and family 
labor variables, and 𝒛𝒊 is a vector of control variables.
26 Production inputs include a flow 
measure of labor services and two measures of the vessel capital stock: total vessel size 
(calculated as the product of length and width in square meters) and engine horsepower. For 
labor services, we multiply the total number of workers on the fishing vessel during the most 
recent trip (including the captain) by the duration in hours of that trip. The vector 𝒙𝒊 includes the 
secondary school attainment dummy, the number of years of fishing experience, and a measure 
of family labor constructed similarly to the total labor services variable. Because captains may 
employ their non-migrated adult working-age children on the boat, we calculate family labor 
services as the natural log of the product of the “Live-in Members” variable with the duration of 
the most recent trip.27 The vector 𝒛𝒊 includes district dummy variables.
28  
Table 5 reports regression estimates of our preferred specification for equation [8], without 
and with the human capital and family labor variables. The statistically significant output 
elasticities approximately sum to one in all specifications, indicating a constant returns to scale 
technology. The human capital and family labor variables are neither individually nor jointly 
statistically significant, as shown in column (2). This null result is robust in the specification that 
we estimated, including many not reported here. Although these results must be interpreted with 
caution because household labor allocation is endogenous to expected outcomes, the result is 
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consistent with a large body of literature on productivity and skill in fisheries showing that 
systematic productivity differences between boats are not robustly explained by observables. 
Rather, some captains are simply more talented than others, or have private information about 
productive fishing locations.29  
The evidence is therefore not consistent with the hypothesis that fishing productivity is the 
channel through which education and family structure affect income diversification. Interactions 
between human capital and family structure in the household utility function or educational 
spillovers from parents to migrant children are most likely driving income diversification.  
 
V. DISCUSSION 
Our results overall suggest that education and family size are determinants of non-fishing 
income decisions. It is more likely that education and family size interact in the household utility 
function, or affect potential non-fishing wages, than that they affect the fishing operations in a 
way that influences non-fishing income decisions.  For example, the finding that educated 
households are less likely to receive any remittances unless they have a large family size is 
consistent with a shame or disutility of requesting remittances – if that shame is greater for 
educated households, but having more potential migrants (and potentially educated migrants if 
there are spillovers from parent to child) reduces the shame. Further, because education is 
associated with more remittances among households who receive positive remittances, education 
may increase the migrant’s earning potential and therefore the amount that they remit. However, 
there are other possibilities for how education and family size interact to determine marginal 
utilities and we cannot disentangle competing explanations. 
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 We can, however, consider a thought experiment on a set of policies that affect market 
variables exogenous to the household. For example, a typical fishing regulatory policy to 
conserve resources is to restrict fishing inputs through vessel size limitations, or seasonal or 
spatial closures. Such regulations are often less costly to implement and enforce than direct 
harvest restrictions, and are therefore common in both developing and developed country 
fisheries. Squires (2016) gives a detailed accounting of the consequences of such regulations in 
Malaysia, finding strong complementarities between fishing inputs. An enforced reduction in one 
input is therefore likely to reduce the marginal product of labor and shift in the fishing labor 
demand curve depicted in Figure 2. This has two possible consequences: first, to induce the 
household to supply more wage labor to the local market than was previously optimal, at a 
potentially lower reservation wage, and second, to reduce the marginal utility of leisure, which 
shifts out the supply curve of labor to distant markets, potentially inducing more out-migration 
even at low remittance rates.  
An alternative policy could be to reduce the transactions costs of migrating and remitting. 
Urban centers in Malaysia are a major source of remittances to rural populations throughout 
Southeast Asia. Often migrants use informal, unlicensed, or illegal channels to transfer money 
back home, either to avoid transactions costs such as high banking fees, or as a result of scams or 
coercion by their employers (Hernandez-Coss et al. 2008). Migrating to an urban center in order 
to send remittances involves significant risks, particularly for international migrants moving to 
places where non-citizens and guest workers have few legal protections.  Similarly, Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006) show that transactions costs for the home household also matter; the 
distance to a Western Union office or similar money transfer institution can affect remittance 
volume. Panel A of Figure 2 shows how reducing these transactions costs and effectively 
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increasing the remittance rate for a given amount of migrant labor could reduce fishing activity 
in a way that improves household welfare, according to our model. If more family members 
migrate and remit, this raises the shadow cost of household labor and reduces the shadow cost of 
income, increasing the reservation wage for local wage work and lowering the equilibrium labor 
allocated to fishing. Consistent with this, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) find that the causal 
effect of remittances is to reduce both formal sector work and self-employment of men, which 
could be interpreted as fishing in our context. However, they also find an offsetting increase in 
informal sector work among men, which is wage employment without a contract. The bulk of 
non-fishing labor income in our setting likely falls in this category. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
interpret this as possibly being driven by disruptive costs of migrating that may affect the 
shadow value of income, but there may also be preferences over job type that are not captured by 
our model.  
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
By considering jointly-determined financial support as an alternative to non-fishing labor 
income, we find that schooling and family size are important determinants of income 
diversification by a household to supplement its fishing income. Fishing households may earn 
supplementary income from supplying labor to local wage employment, or request financial 
support from family members including income-earning children. Non-fishing labor supply 
directly adjusts both the time constraint and the income constraint, whereas financial support also 
affects household utility. Assuming leisure is a normal good, greater diversification in income 
may transfer labor from low-rewarding fishing activities to better-rewarding non-fishing 
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activities, thereby increasing utility (e.g., Fafchamps and Quisumbing 1999; Holden, Shiferaw, 
and Pender 2004; Yang 1997a; Taylor and Yunez-Naude 2000).  
We find that the effect of family size on this choice depends on the education level of the 
household head and vice versa. Uneducated fishermen with larger families have a lower 
probability of earning non-fishing labor income, and are more likely to receive contributions 
from live-in adult children who are most likely employed in the family fishing enterprise. 
Educated fishermen with fewer children, on the other hand, receive a greater volume of migrant 
remittances and are less likely to earn non-fishing labor income. This trend reverses for educated 
fishermen with larger families. Therefore, although education alone does not induce 
diversification away from fishing for the current generation, it does potentially enhance the 
reallocation of labor away from fishing at least for their children and may therefore have larger 
long-run effects on resource conservation. The important implications of our empirical findings 
are that educated households may more highly value, and invest in, the education of their 
children, which further alters the pattern of income diversification of resource-dependent 
households.  
Thus, any policy intervention targeting either the conservation of the fishing sector or the 
development of non-fishing employment sectors, or more generally, employment sectors not 
dependent on natural resources, must focus on the development of education and family 
characteristics in the targeted community. In addition, our results suggest caution in basing 
policies on simple assumptions concerning the impacts of outside employment opportunities and 
financial support on the allocation of household labor to fishing. For example, given that outside 
employment and remittances increase income, it is tempting to conclude that an increased flow 
of financial support or a better opportunity of outside employment may lower a household’s 
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dependency on fishing. However, such a conclusion is too simplistic. As previous work has 
found, household members reallocate their resources, including labor time, in response to 
changes in economic conditions and the value of work they do (Huffman 1980; Shively and 
Fisher 2004).  Our results suggest that this is certainly the case for fishing-dependent households 
in Malaysia, and that there is a major difference in the behavioral response of educated fishermen 
with smaller families as opposed to uneducated fishermen with larger households.  If the overall 
objective is to reduce the dependence of poor households on fishing, then policies should be 
targeted at increasing the sources of income for uneducated fishermen with larger families. 
Furthermore, education and training policies should be considered on a generational time scale 
particularly if state-provided education can supplement parent-to-child human capital spillovers. 
Bringing down the cost of remittances has become a major policy objective of G20 nations in 
recent years (World Bank 2014) and the Central Bank of Malaysia has also made recent moves 
to regulate the remittance transfer industry and reduce remittance costs (bin Ibrahim 2015). More 
research is needed on the impact of such policies on rural natural resource management in 
recipient communities. 
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TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
      
Variables Descriptions Mean S.D. Min. Max 
      
Schooling Dummy: 1 if the fisherman is at least secondary educated, 0 if not  0.30 0.46 0 1 
Fishing Income Monthly total fishing income 816.24 2896.15 0 50000 
Non-fishing Income Monthly total non-fishing labor income 247.97 1065.37 0 13000 
Live-in contributions Financial support received from live-in children 14.15 66.40 0 600 
Live-away Remittances Financial support received from live-away children 19.39 75.75 0 750 
Family Size Total number of family members 7.64 3.51 1 35 
Age  Proxy for age: Number of year the fisherman living in the village 36.46 15.88 1 80 
Boat Ownership Dummy: 1 if the fisherman owns the fishing boat, 0 if not 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Boat Size Dummy: 1 if bigger boat, 0 if smaller boat  0.41 0.49 0 1 
Membership Dummy: 1 if the fisherman has any professional membership, 0 if not 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Total fishing revenue Total revenue earned from the last fishing trip 2951.64 12205.11 0 162005 
Total cost total (input) cost in the last fishing trip 253.91 328.16 0 2152.8 
Peak earning Captain’s total fishing income during the peak season 4897.85 23293.55 25 380000 
Lean earning Captain’s total fishing income during the lean season 657.64 2019.51 0 16000 
Peak catch Total catch (kg) during peak season 2507.67 8012.01 0 100000 
Lean catch Total catch (kg) during the lean season 443.88 1696.09 0 15000 
Trip people  Number of people in the latest trip 6.35 8.35 1 40 
Trip duration No. of hours spent in last trip 26.17 49.59 1 373 
Boat length  Length of the boat used in the latest trip 11.42 6.43 2 40 
Boat width Width of the boat used in the latest trip 3.34 2.06 0.83 15 
Horsepower Horsepower of the boat engine in the latest trip 115.52 226.42 1.30 3000 
Tonnage  Gross tonnage of the boat in the latest trip 10.26 16.07 0.02 160 
Owner share Owner's % share of total catch 0.54 0.30 0 1 
Captain share Captain's % share of total catch 0.14 0.18 0 1 
Crew share Crew's % share of total catch 0.27 0.20 0 0.8 
Notes: Total number of observation is 354. Income and cost figures are in 2005 Malaysian Ringgit (MYR). We define fiber boats, 
lesen sampan and zone-A boats as smaller, and zones B and C boats as bigger boats. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics by Groups 
  
 Groups 
Variables NF=0, FS=0 NF>0, FS=0 NF=0, FS>0 NF>0, FS>0 
     
Schooling 0.32 
(0.47) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.14 
(0.38) 
Fishing Income 1023.74 
(3703.53) 
464.36 
(366.07) 
524.55 
(275.28) 
685.71 
(452.51) 
Non-fishing Income  1069.87 
(2063.58) 
 619.00 
(654.12) 
Live-in contributions   75.64 
(129.83) 
121.43 
(223.34) 
Live-away Remittances   103.00 
(132.64) 
171.43 
(264.35) 
Family Size 7.48 
(3.32) 
6.81 
(2.83) 
9.16 
(4.55) 
9.29 
(2.21) 
Age  35.38 
(15.70) 
36.40 
(14.24) 
40.04 
(18.54) 
42.14 
(13.63) 
Boat Ownership 0.73 
(0.44) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
0.80 
(0.40) 
0.86 
(0.38) 
Boat Size 0.44 
(0.50) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.14 
(0.38) 
Membership 0.79 
(0.41) 
0.92 
(0.27) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
Total fishing revenue 3934.01 
(15217.24) 
1827.12 
(5675.16) 
1058.28 
(2694.52) 
576.29 
(987.03) 
Total cost 295.38 
(365.01) 
197.64 
(290.82) 
184.22 
(176.62) 
165.90 
(288.76) 
Peak earning 4279.32 
(10929.14) 
8818.36 
(46571.11) 
1909.79 
(3846.97) 
4676.00 
(5818.15) 
Lean earning 691.38 
(1835.79) 
893.91 
(2953.16) 
250.02 
(834.10) 
136.00 
(260.25) 
Peak catch 2754.60 
(6695.98) 
2953.08 
(12520.66) 
1038.82 
(3025.18) 
1591.67 
(2275.61) 
Lean catch 471.04 
(1575.88) 
517.01 
(2200.85) 
266.31 
(1406.50) 
171.67 
(405.83) 
Trip people  7.39 
(9.33) 
4.90 
(6.98) 
4.69 
(5.48) 
4.29 
(5.35) 
Trip duration 32.30 
(55.90) 
16.91 
(44.29) 
16.23 
(20.96) 
19.96 
(35.31) 
Boat length  12.31 
(6.94) 
9.69 
(5.74) 
10.41 
(4.75) 
11.84 
(4.71) 
Boat width 3.63 
(2.17) 
2.80 
(2.06) 
2.96 
(1.38) 
3.41 
(1.57) 
Horsepower 128.42 
(241.70) 
109.41 
(250.46) 
81.22 
(111.15) 
61.14 
(63.61) 
Tonnage  12.27 
(18.80) 
6.53 
(10.25) 
8.13 
(9.94) 
6.84 
(6.74) 
Owner share 0.52 
(0.29) 
0.59 
(0.29) 
0.55 
(0.31) 
0.49 
(0.31) 
Captain share 0.14 
(0.18) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
0.12 
(0.21) 
0.14 
(0.21) 
Crew share 0.29 
(0.21) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
0.27 
(0.20) 
0.30 
(0.24) 
Number of observations 214 (60.45%) 78 (22.03%) 55 (15.54%) 7 (1.98%) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses, unless otherwise mentioned. Income and cost figures are in 2005 Malaysian Ringgit 
(MYR). NF and FS, respectively, stand for non-fishing incomes and financial support. We define fiber boats, lesen sampan and 
zone-A boats as smaller, and zones B and C boats as bigger boats. 
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TABLE 3 
Non-fishing Labor Income and Financial Support 
       
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 Participation equations  
(Bivariate probit coefficients and marginal effects) 
 Amount equations 
(Linear maximum likelihood) 
Variables 𝑑𝑛𝑓 
[P10] 
𝑑𝑓𝑠 
[P01] 
 
[P00] 
 𝑙𝑛𝑓  𝑙𝑓𝑠 
       
Schooling -0.725** -0.536   -1.374** 2.991*** 
 (0.365) (0.420)   (0.659) (0.884) 
 [-0.161*] [-0.079] [0.284**]    
Family Size -0.081*** 0.064**   0.004 0.042 
 (0.026) (0.030)   (0.051) (0.028) 
 [-0.022***] [0.015**] [0.008]    
Schooling*Size  0.125*** 0.025   0.155* -0.286** 
 (0.048) (0.047)   (0.085) (0.114) 
 [0.030***] [0.000] [-0.036**]    
Age  0.038* -0.019   0.087** -0.013 
 (0.019) (0.019)   (0.043) (0.019) 
 [0.010**] [-0.005] [-0.006]    
Squared Age -0.001* 0.000   -0.001* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) 
 [-0.000**] [0.000*] [0.000]    
Boat Ownership -0.207 0.041   0.079 0.227 
 (0.159) (0.207)   (0.317) (0.354) 
 [-0.053] [0.015] [0.044]    
Boat Size -0.234 0.377*   0.395 -0.173 
 (0.232) (0.206)   (0.326) (0.193) 
 [-0.072] [0.081**] [-0.014]    
Membership 0.693*** 0.414   0.269 -0.437 
 (0.217) (0.257)   (0.412) (0.280) 
 [0.158***] [0.056] [-0.252***]    
       
District dummies YES YES   YES YES 
       
Observations 339   81 61 
chi2 170.5***     
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) 7.71**     
Pseudo-R2     0.0899 0.105 
F statistics     4.483*** 5.557*** 
       
Tests of joint significance        
(1) 9.37*   2.20 9.74*** 
(2) 17.45***   3.88** 3.23** 
(3) 24.76***   2.69** 6.53*** 
Notes: Coefficient standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses, and marginal effects are in bracketed italics. 
***,** and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Dependent variables 𝑑𝑛𝑓 and 𝑑𝑓𝑠, respectively, 
are binary outcomes denoting non-fishing wage income (1 if the fisherman earns any non-fishing wage income and 0 if not) and 
financial support (1 if the fisherman receives any financial support from children and 0 if not), and logged values of non-fishing 
labor income (i.e., 𝑙𝑛𝑓) and financial support (i.e., 𝑙𝑓𝑠). We denote P10=Pr(NF>0, FS=0), P01=Pr(NF=0, FS>0), and 
P00=Pr(NF=0, FS=0). The null hypotheses in tests of joint significance are (1) Schooling and Schooling-Family interactions are 
jointly zero, (2) Family and Schooling-Family interactions are jointly zero, (3) Schooling, Family, and Schooling-Family 
interactions are jointly zero. 
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TABLE 4 
Non-fishing Labor Income and Financial Support: Separating Live-in Adult Children and Migrants 
        
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Participation equations  
(Trivariate probit coefficients) 
 Amount equations 
(Linear maximum likelihood) 
Variables 𝑑𝑛𝑓 𝑑𝑓𝑠1 𝑑𝑓𝑠2  𝑙𝑛𝑓  𝑙𝑓𝑠1 𝑙𝑓𝑠2 
        
Schooling -0.720* -0.011 -0.804  -1.289* -3.298 3.694*** 
 (0.369) (0.846) (0.513)  (0.717) (6.390) (0.663) 
Family Size -0.079*** 0.124*** 0.030  0.010 -0.034 -0.008 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.029)  (0.051) (0.030) (0.035) 
Schooling*Size  0.121** -0.059 0.071  0.136 0.447 -0.330*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.050)  (0.093) (0.883) (0.077) 
Age  0.035*    0.090**   
 (0.018)    (0.043)   
Squared Age -0.000*    -0.001*   
 (0.000)    (0.001)   
Boat Ownership -0.142  -0.145  0.039  0.712* 
 (0.156)  (0.250)  (0.337)  (0.389) 
Boat Size  0.109 0.391*   0.340 -0.020 
  (0.325) (0.226)   (0.254) (0.275) 
Membership 0.700*** 0.131 0.587**  0.204 -0.342 -0.160 
 (0.206) (0.342) (0.239)  (0.411) (0.256) (0.380) 
        
District dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
Observations 339 339 339  81 28 39 
        
Tests of joint 
significance  
       
(1) 14.74**    1.77 0.14 20.61*** 
(2) 47.11***    3.01* 0.69 10.39*** 
(3) 76.25***    2.15 0.51 13.93*** 
Notes: Coefficient standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. ***,** and * represent statistical significance of 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Dependent variables 𝑑𝑛𝑓 and 𝑑𝑓𝑠, respectively, are binary outcomes denoting non-fishing wage 
income (1 if the fisherman earns any non-fishing wage income and 0 if not) and financial support (1 if the fisherman receives any 
financial support from children and 0 if not), and logged values of non-fishing labor income (i.e., 𝑙𝑛𝑓), live-in contributions (i.e., 
𝑙𝑓𝑠1) and live-away remittances (i.e., 𝑙𝑓𝑠2). The null hypotheses in tests of joint significance are (1) Schooling and Schooling-
Family interactions are jointly zero, (2) Family and Schooling-Family interactions are jointly zero, (3) Schooling, Family, and 
Schooling-Family interactions are jointly zero.  
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TABLE 5 
Fishing Productivity and Secondary School Attainment 
   
Variables (1) (2) 
   
Total Labor Services 0.49*** 0.49*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Boat Area 0.24* 0.25* 
 (0.13) (0.14) 
Engine Horsepower 0.27** 0.23* 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Live-in Members  0.07 
  (0.04) 
Schooling  0.15 
  (0.24) 
Experience  0.02 
  (0.03) 
Squared Experience  -0.00 
  (0.00) 
   
District dummies YES YES 
   
Observations 309 309 
R-squared 0.55 0.55 
   
Tests of joint significance of Live-in Members, 
Schooling, and Experience 
  
F  1.49 
p-value  0.21 
   
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. ***,** and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural log of fishing revenue earned during the respondent’s most recent 
fishing trip. The explanatory variables are also in natural logs, except for Schooling which is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the respondent has a secondary education, and Experience which is measured in years. District dummies are included in 
each regression; their coefficients are available upon request.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1  
Optimal solutions 
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Figure 2  
Comparative statics 
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1 For example, Takasaki, Barham, and Coomes (2010) found that, irrespective of labor and capital endowments, 
riverine households in the Peruvian Amazon intensify fishing effort through increased ex post labor supply in 
smoothing income in response to crop losses caused by large floods. 
2 Exceptions include Coomes, Barham, and Takasaki (2004), Takasaki, Barham, and Coomes (2004), Barbier 
(2007), Barbier (2010), and Reddy, Groves, and Nagavarapu (2014). However, none these papers considers the issue 
of remittance demand jointly with off-resource labor supply. 
3 For example, Kirkley, Squires and Strand (1998) find a positive relationship between education and productivity in 
a U.S. fishery; Viswanathan et al. (2001) and Susilowati et al. (2005) find no relationship in Malaysian and 
Indonesian fisheries (respectively); Gilbert and Yeo (2014) find a negative relationship among an artisanal 
subsample of the Malaysian vessels studied in this paper; and finally Squires et al. (2003) find different relationships 
in fisheries on different sides of Peninsular Malaysia. One interpretation is that the relationship between education 
and fishing productivity may depend on the development status and market integration of the fishery being studied. 
4 Existing literature on remittances focuses on either the microeconomic determinants of the likeliness and flow of 
remittances or the macroeconomic impacts of the flow of remittances (e.g., Lucas and Stark 1985; Rapoport and 
Docquier 2006; Yang 2011; Brown and Jimenez-Soto 2014). Microeconomic literature primarily focuses on the 
determinants and motives of migrants’ remittances: while the decision to migrate depends on migrant’s 
characteristics (Funkhouser 1995), likeliness and flow of remittances are determined by migrants’ motives to remit 
such as altruism, self-interest, loan repayment, inheritances (Lucas and Stark 1985; Rapoport and Docquier 2006). 
One exception is McCormick and Wahba (2000), who considered both the demand and supply sides in a simple 
general equilibrium model, still with heavy emphasis on the supply side and policy implications for brain-drain. 
5 For example, McCormick and Wahba (2000) assumed unlimited land resources available to the agricultural sector 
in migrant’s source country when drawing direct implications for brain-drain. However, their model is not suitable 
to study natural resource management in a decaying industry. 
                                                          
50 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 The LH model was chosen as the best fit among a class of two part Tobit models for the presence of optimally-
chosen corner solutions (as opposed to incidental truncation or sample selection) (Wooldridge 2010). 
7 There may be differences in labor endowment by gender, age, or migratory status. An alternative approach would 
be to consider a joint household utility function that takes the utility of different categories of household members as 
separate arguments, with separate labor time constraints (e.g., migrants and non-migrants, males and females, 
parents and children). This is the approach, for example, in McCormick and Wahba (2000) who model the joint 
household utility of migrants and non-migrants. A more detailed approach serves McCormick & Wahba’s purpose 
to develop a multi-sector general equilibrium model of both the local and the distant labor market. The purpose of 
our model is to motivate our empirical study and clarify the key tradeoffs for the household, and we do not observe 
gender differences in household composition, detailed age information about members other than the household 
head, or information about the migrants’ labor market. For our purpose, a more detailed approach like McCormick 
& Wahba’s applied to different categories of household membership substantially complicates the model without 
providing additional insight for what we can observe with our data. Our simplified approach nevertheless treats each 
household member’s labor supply as an integral part of the household’s jointly optimal resource allocation, which is 
in the spirit of the NELM literature. 
8 Associating disutility with financial support from children has some indirect support in the literature. Apart from 
altruism, which is empirically less robust, other motives behind remitting money from children to parents include 
tacit agreements regarding future financial and asset transfers from parents to children (e.g., Lucas and Stark 1985; 
Yang 2011). Especially in the case of more than one child, such financial support from one child can bias the future 
allocation of inheritances. Such obligations may also generate disutility for the household head.   
9 Since we do not have any information of host sector, we define risk in terms of fishing income. Therefore, the 
relationship between risk and remittances empirically resembles to investigating the altruism motive (e.g., Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2006). Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) argued that if migrants remit more in response risks 
in home encountered by the left-behind family members, migrants’ remittance-sending behavior is consistent with 
altruism and inconsistent with insurance.  
10 Common motives for migrants’ remittances include asset accumulation, insurance and altruism. Irrespective of the 
motive, remittances help rural households to smooth their income especially in response to income shocks (Yang 
and Choi 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2011), which is particularly true for the poor households from 
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developing countries often experience lack of reliable social insurance programs, inadequate liquid savings, and 
binding borrowing constraints (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2011). Especially since credit constraint restricts 
relatively deprived or poorer households and individuals from moving from agriculture to modern sector (Banerjee 
and Newman 1998), and temporary migrants are more likely to remit more (Dustmann and Mestres 2010), internal 
temporary migration is a common coping strategy in many developing countries (Gröger and Zylberberg 2016). 
Gröger and Zylberberg (2016) found that Vietnamese households with settled migrants ex ante receive more 
remittances; whereas non-migrant households send family members away to diversify the sources of income.  
11 We have accounted for the number of dependent children attending school, the number of nonworking dependents 
(e.g., smaller children and elderly relatives), as well as the number of adult, working-age children living either at 
home (i.e., live-in) or away from home (i.e., live-away), which allows for the possibility that not all working-age 
family members contribute to the household labor endowment. Literature identifying these determinants include, 
among others, Lucas and Stark (1985), Faini (1994), McCormick and Wahba (2000), Funkhouser (1995) and Yang 
(2011).  
12 For simplicity, we analyze a static setting and do not explicitly model the dynamics of capital accumulation or 
resource stock growth and depletion. The average boat in our sample is halfway through the expected total lifespan 
of 18 years, so our assumption that marginal labor supply and financial support demand decisions are made 
conditional on predetermined capital choices is reasonable in the context of our empirical application. Our setup also 
implicitly assumes that all boats have equal access to resource stocks and equal exposure to fishing regulations 𝑁. In 
our empirical setting stocks may vary across allowable fishing zones within different regions, but access to different 
fishing zones is determined by vessel type, and we control for vessel type and location in our econometric 
specifications. 
13 This simplification follows the works of Gisser (1965), Gould and Saupe (1989), Huffman and Lange (1989), 
Schultz (1988), Sumner (1982), Yang (1997a), among others. Schultz (1988) documented that higher schooling 
often leads farming households to prioritize off-farm employment over farm labor. Gisser (1965) and Huffman 
(1980) find that education increases the off-farm employment of farm operators. Huffman and Lange (1989) and 
Gould and Saupe (1989) find that a husband or wife with higher schooling has a significantly greater probability of 
engaging in nonfarm jobs.  
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14 In our empirical application, almost all of the households are in Panels A, B, or C – very few pursue outside 
employment and receive remittances – but those that do have larger than average families and lower than average 
secondary school attainment (see Table 1). It is also worth noting that only the cases in Panels C and D, in which 
positive non-fishing labor is supplied, are fully recursive in the sense that labor supply and leisure demand decisions 
can be made independently because the market wage for non-fishing labor equates the marginal values of labor and 
leisure along a continuum of allocations (Jacoby 1993), and none of the cases allow labor allocation and remittance 
demand decisions to be made independently. Our empirical approach will specifically allow for dependence across 
the labor supply and remittance demand decisions. 
15 A standard Type I Tobit model, a Truncated Normal Hurdle model (Cragg 1971), and an Exponential Type II 
Tobit (ET2T) model (Wooldridge 2010) produced qualitatively similar results and were rejected in favor of the 
Lognormal Hurdle model on the basis of model fit using Likelihood Ratio tests and Vuong’s (1989) tests. The ET2T 
model allows for correlation between the errors in the participation equation and the errors in the amount equation, 
and is most similar to the well-known Heckman two-step approach (Heckman 1976), except that the outcome is 
defined by an exponential function. Our ET2T estimates of the correlation between the participation and amount 
equations (available upon request) were either marginally significant or not statistically significant and of the wrong 
sign, even when allowing for an exclusion restriction, and the fit of the ET2T model is inferior to the LH model. 
This is consistent with the discussion and findings in Wooldridge (2010) for labor supply data. We therefore favor 
the LH model in the reported results. The additional results for all models are available upon request. 
16 This is consistent with Carling (2008), who argued that remittances decisions are made in two-steps: 1) whether to 
remit or not, and 2) if yes, how much to remit. 
17 This last assumption is relaxed in the ET2T model, which we rule out empirically in results that are available upon 
request. See footnote 15. 
18 Our model departs from Wooldridge’s exposition of the LH model only in that we allow a system of two 
participation and two amount equations, with correlation across the participation equations. Our approach is 
otherwise identical to Wooldridge (2010). 
19 Such log-transformations of dependent variables greatly reduce the variances and skewness and kurtosis statistics, 
and, therefore, justify the use of lognormal models (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 2010). 
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20 We unfortunately do not have a continuous measure for educational attainment. The survey instrument asks 
respondents whether they have completed primary school or secondary school, and the majority of the variation 
occurs at secondary school attainment. 
21 Our findings are also robust to the inclusion of a control for total fishing earnings, which captures the need for 
supplementary income. Because fishing earnings are also endogenous to the household labor allocation problem, we 
omit this variable in reported results. 
22 Details of the data collection can be found in Yeo et al. (2007). 
23 We do not report the district dummies in the regression tables, but coefficients are available upon request. 
24 We use the notation P11=Pr(NF>0, FS>0), P10=Pr(NF>0, FS=0), P01=Pr(NF=0, FS>0) and P00=Pr(NF=0, 
FS=0). 
25 As an additional exercise to better understand how educational attainment creates a divergent effect of family size, 
we disaggregate the family size variable into the three family composition variables: student household members 
and adult live-in and live-away members. The estimated results are consistent with those reported in Table 3. 
However, there are two important caveats associated with these family composition variables. First, respondents do 
not directly provide the number of working-age children living outside the home (i.e., the number of migrants), 
although they do directly provide the total family size and the number of students and working-age children living 
inside the household, as well as the amount of money contributed to household income by live-in working-age 
children and working-age children living outside the home. We proxy for the number of working-age children living 
outside the home using the total family size, less the number of school age children and the working-age children 
living in the home. While this proxy may overestimate the number of migrants if there are also infant children or 
elderly family members living at home, our results are more consistent with the likelihood that this variable captures 
the intended variation. Second, the allocation of family members by the household to school, local work, and 
migrant work is endogenous to the total remittance and non-fishing labor earnings. We do not include this 
specification in main text due to the unavailability of direct measures of family composition variables in the MTS-
2005 dataset; rather left them as a potential future research using an appropriate dataset.  
26 For detailed information about fishing activity, the survey instrument asks about the most recent fishing trip 
because survey respondents can recall recent events more accurately than they can guess their annual totals or 
monthly averages. 
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27 We do not know which captains in our sample employ their children on their fishing boat. Results from 
specifications that exclude potential family labor or use alternative measures of family labor are almost identical to 
those reported here and are available upon request. 
28 In unreported results, we tested a large number of specifications of equation [8], all of which are consistent with 
the reported results. We included vessel gross tonnage and estimated [8] with each combination of capital stock 
variables; we augmented family labor services with both live-in working-age and school-age children together and 
separately; we replaced the family labor services variable with total family size and the product of family size with 
trip duration, in logs and levels; we included interactions between family labor services, human capital variables, 
and production inputs; and we controlled for membership in a fisherman’s organization. We report the model with 
the greatest number of zero restrictions on the 𝒘𝒊 and 𝒛𝒊 vectors that could not be rejected, and a parsimonious set of 
human capital and family labor variables 𝒙𝒊 that conveys the robust result. 
29 See, for example, Kirkley, Squires and Strand (1998); Viswanathan et al. (2001); Susilowati et al. (2005); Gilbert 
and Yeo (2014); and Squires et al. (2003) as discussed in footnote 3. 
